System 01 · Statutory data source live since January 2026

Sentinel

Public procurement integrity and collusion detection

Turns the Procurement Act’s new mandatory transparency data into a live map of who really wins public contracts — and who is connected to whom.

Fraud & integrityCentral governmentPublic money

The problem

Government estimates fraud and error across the public sector at £55bn–£81bn a year, excluding tax and welfare. The Public Sector Fraud Authority reported £7.53bn saved in the last financial year and credited the result explicitly to AI and advanced data-matching — but that work concentrates on grants and payments, not on the award stage where procurement fraud originates.

The classic red flags of bid-rigging are all detectable in data that is now public: single-bidder tenders, repeated runner-up patterns, suppliers sharing directors or registered addresses, contracts split just below thresholds, and award values clustering suspiciously close to estimates. Nobody in UK government is systematically looking for them across all buyers at once.

The Procurement Act 2023 improved the raw material substantially. From 1 January 2026 contracting authorities must publish supplier performance for contracts over £5m, and from 1 April 2026 suppliers awarded below-threshold contracts must register on the Central Digital Platform and supply their Companies House number.

Identifier coverage is contested, and the disagreement is itself the finding. Two independent measurements against the live feed in August 2026 disagreed sharply — roughly 65% of supplier records carrying no scheme when counting company numbers on supplier entries alone, against roughly 8% when counting the Procurement Act’s own organisation number across all parties. Both are defensible. The identifier exists; it is not where most consumers look for it. That organisation number is the key worth building on — it exists for councils, NHS trusts and unincorporated bodies with no company number, it survives group restructuring, and the debarment list is keyed on it. What nothing publishes is the mapping between it and Companies House.

One constraint eliminates most of the academic literature. Individual bid prices are never published in UK procurement data — only aggregate statistics, and bidder counts appear on roughly 30% of awards. That rules out the entire statistical screen family: coefficient of variation, relative distance, normalised distance and the missing-bids test. Sentinel is designed around what exists rather than what the papers assume.

The Open Contracting Partnership’s one-year analysis found 57 of 71 integrity indicators are now computable, up from 35 under the old regime — and that single-bid tenders cost around 7% more. It also found institutional variation nobody is acting on: Bristol awards 95% of below-threshold contracts non-competitively; Leeds under 30%. Transparency International identified 135 COVID contracts worth £15.3bn carrying three or more corruption red flags.

One structural obstacle explains why this has not been done. Companies House publishes free bulk files for companies and PSCs, but there is no free bulk officers file — the directorship graph can only be assembled company-by-company through a rate-limited API across 4.93 million active companies. That single asymmetry is why UK director-network analysis is dominated by commercial products rather than public ones.

£55–81bn
Government’s own published estimate of annual fraud and error, excluding tax and welfare
£7.53bn
Counter-fraud savings government attributes to AI and data-matching in the last year
0
Suppliers on the debarment list after 18 months of the regime
0.5%
Recovery rate on procurement spend that would repay the platform many times over

The system

Sentinel ingests the full public procurement record — Find a Tender, Contracts Finder and the Central Digital Platform — and resolves suppliers to Companies House entities. Because roughly two-thirds of records carry no usable identifier, that resolution is the system’s hardest engineering problem rather than a given: identifier where present, probabilistic name and address matching where not, with match confidence published on every link and low-confidence links never silently merged. It then builds a national graph connecting suppliers to their directors, persons with significant control, registered addresses and corporate parents.

Against that graph it runs an indicator suite derived from established international practice — the EU’s Digital Whistleblower red-flag set, the World Bank’s procurement analytics, and Ukraine’s ProZorro/Dozorro monitoring model — scoring every award and every buyer for risk rather than accusing anyone of wrongdoing.

Output is a triage queue for investigators, not a verdict. Each flag carries its evidence, its statistical basis and a plain-English explanation, so a commercial officer can dismiss it in thirty seconds or escalate it with a full audit trail.


Worked examples

Two situations this system answers

EXAMPLE 1
The problem

Three companies bid for a £4m council contract. Two of them share a director. Nobody notices, because neither record carries a company number and the buyer has no way to check.

What Sentinel does

Sentinel works out which real companies the three bidders are, sees that two of them share a director, and flags the bid as connected — before the contract is awarded, not after an investigation.

EXAMPLE 2
The problem

A framework worth £200m produces 400 call-offs across dozens of authorities. Six suppliers win most of them. No single buyer sees the pattern, because each call-off is one record in one authority.

What Sentinel does

Sentinel adds up every order placed under that framework across every authority, and shows that six firms are taking most of it. This is the clearest warning sign available in UK data.


Data foundation

Every dataset below is open, or its access constraint is stated

DatasetPublisherWhat it provides
Central Digital PlatformCabinet OfficeSupplier registration, unique supplier identifiers, contract performance notices, payment performance. Mandatory below-threshold registration from 1 April 2026.
Find a Tender ServiceCabinet OfficeStatutory notices for above-threshold procurement across the UK public sector.
Contracts FinderCabinet OfficeContract award notices, including below-threshold awards in England.
Companies House API + bulk productsCompanies HouseCompany records, officer appointments, PSC register, filing history, dissolution status. Free API under OGL v3.
Local authority spend over £500300+ councilsTransaction-level payments. Fragmented schemas — normalised by System 10.
Charity Commission registerCharity CommissionTrustee networks, for public bodies contracting with the voluntary sector.

Capabilities

01
Supplier identity resolution
Every award tied to a canonical legal entity despite two-thirds of records lacking an identifier — surviving name changes, group restructures and typos, with confidence published per match. In one sample the same firm appeared as both “SOFTCAT LTD - FCA” and “SOFTCAT PLC”, with no company number on either.
02
Connection graph
Shared directors, PSCs, registered addresses and corporate parents across bidders on the same tender — the single strongest signal of a rigged competition.
03
Framework call-off concentration
The strongest collusion signal actually available in UK data. The related-processes field works reliably, exposing small supplier rings winning a disproportionate share of call-offs under one framework.
04
Competition intensity index
Bidder counts by buyer, category and value band where published, benchmarked nationally. Coverage is reported as a metric rather than assumed.
05
Threshold-splitting detection
Sequential awards to one supplier that individually fall below a procurement threshold and collectively exceed it.
06
Performance-to-award linkage
Ties the new contract performance notices back to award characteristics, so buyers can see whether cheap bids actually deliver.
07
Investigator case workspace
Flags triaged, assigned, annotated and closed with reasons, producing a defensible audit record and training data for calibration.
08
Buyer self-service
Every contracting authority sees its own risk profile benchmarked against comparable bodies before anyone else does.

Benefits

For government

  • Gives the Public Sector Fraud Authority — now within DWP — an award-stage capability to sit alongside its existing payment-stage work.
  • Lets the Government Commercial Agency see competition health across the whole public estate rather than one framework at a time.
  • Provides evidence for debarment decisions under the Procurement Act, which currently rest on limited investigative capacity.
  • Turns a compliance burden — the new notice regime — into a management asset, which strengthens the case for the transparency rules themselves.

For the public

  • Money recovered or never lost is money not taken from services, using government’s own framing of savings as nurses and repaired roads.
  • Local journalists and researchers get a usable national view of who wins public money in their area.
  • Honest suppliers benefit: collusion suppresses competition and inflates prices, and SMEs are the main losers.

Delivery

Likely sponsor
Public Sector Fraud Authority (DWP), Government Commercial Agency, Cabinet Office
Procurement route
SBRI for the detection engine, then G-Cloud 15 Lot 2b for the platform

Phasing

1
Ingest and resolve
3 months
Full historical load of Find a Tender, Contracts Finder and Companies House. Entity resolution benchmarked against a hand-labelled sample.
2
Indicator calibration
3 months
Red-flag suite tuned against known UK enforcement cases and international baselines. False-positive rate is the acceptance criterion, not flag volume.
3
Investigator pilot
6 months
Deployed with one central department and one combined authority. Success measured by cases escalated and value recovered, not flags produced.
4
National rollout
12 months
Buyer self-service opened to all contracting authorities; public interface published under OGL.

Risks & mitigations

False accusation

Shared directors are common and usually innocent. The system scores risk and never asserts wrongdoing; every output is a prompt for human review with its evidence attached.

Data quality upstream

Companies House data has known accuracy problems. Identity verification under ECCTA is improving this, and Sentinel reports data-quality defects back as a by-product.

Gaming

Publishing the indicator logic teaches evasion. Core indicators are published for accountability; weightings and thresholds are held privately and rotated.

The bid-level ceiling — stated plainly

Textbook cartel screening needs every bid including losing ones. Public data publishes awards, and independent analysis found the tenderer-count field is frequently recorded as zero. Sentinel can therefore detect single-bidder concentration, threshold splitting, rotation patterns and bidder relatedness — but not classical bid-rigging signatures. Going deeper requires buyer cooperation to supply their own tender records, which is a design assumption, not an afterthought. Any proposal claiming full cartel detection from open data alone is overselling.


Sources

All sources checked in August 2026. Figures carry the reference period of their source, which may differ from publication date. Where a figure could not be verified against a primary source it is not used.