The problem
Government estimates fraud and error across the public sector at £55bn–£81bn a year, excluding tax and welfare. The Public Sector Fraud Authority reported £7.53bn saved in the last financial year and credited the result explicitly to AI and advanced data-matching — but that work concentrates on grants and payments, not on the award stage where procurement fraud originates.
The classic red flags of bid-rigging are all detectable in data that is now public: single-bidder tenders, repeated runner-up patterns, suppliers sharing directors or registered addresses, contracts split just below thresholds, and award values clustering suspiciously close to estimates. Nobody in UK government is systematically looking for them across all buyers at once.
The Procurement Act 2023 improved the raw material substantially. From 1 January 2026 contracting authorities must publish supplier performance for contracts over £5m, and from 1 April 2026 suppliers awarded below-threshold contracts must register on the Central Digital Platform and supply their Companies House number.
Identifier coverage is contested, and the disagreement is itself the finding. Two independent measurements against the live feed in August 2026 disagreed sharply — roughly 65% of supplier records carrying no scheme when counting company numbers on supplier entries alone, against roughly 8% when counting the Procurement Act’s own organisation number across all parties. Both are defensible. The identifier exists; it is not where most consumers look for it. That organisation number is the key worth building on — it exists for councils, NHS trusts and unincorporated bodies with no company number, it survives group restructuring, and the debarment list is keyed on it. What nothing publishes is the mapping between it and Companies House.
One constraint eliminates most of the academic literature. Individual bid prices are never published in UK procurement data — only aggregate statistics, and bidder counts appear on roughly 30% of awards. That rules out the entire statistical screen family: coefficient of variation, relative distance, normalised distance and the missing-bids test. Sentinel is designed around what exists rather than what the papers assume.
The Open Contracting Partnership’s one-year analysis found 57 of 71 integrity indicators are now computable, up from 35 under the old regime — and that single-bid tenders cost around 7% more. It also found institutional variation nobody is acting on: Bristol awards 95% of below-threshold contracts non-competitively; Leeds under 30%. Transparency International identified 135 COVID contracts worth £15.3bn carrying three or more corruption red flags.
One structural obstacle explains why this has not been done. Companies House publishes free bulk files for companies and PSCs, but there is no free bulk officers file — the directorship graph can only be assembled company-by-company through a rate-limited API across 4.93 million active companies. That single asymmetry is why UK director-network analysis is dominated by commercial products rather than public ones.
The system
Sentinel ingests the full public procurement record — Find a Tender, Contracts Finder and the Central Digital Platform — and resolves suppliers to Companies House entities. Because roughly two-thirds of records carry no usable identifier, that resolution is the system’s hardest engineering problem rather than a given: identifier where present, probabilistic name and address matching where not, with match confidence published on every link and low-confidence links never silently merged. It then builds a national graph connecting suppliers to their directors, persons with significant control, registered addresses and corporate parents.
Against that graph it runs an indicator suite derived from established international practice — the EU’s Digital Whistleblower red-flag set, the World Bank’s procurement analytics, and Ukraine’s ProZorro/Dozorro monitoring model — scoring every award and every buyer for risk rather than accusing anyone of wrongdoing.
Output is a triage queue for investigators, not a verdict. Each flag carries its evidence, its statistical basis and a plain-English explanation, so a commercial officer can dismiss it in thirty seconds or escalate it with a full audit trail.
Worked examples
Two situations this system answers
Three companies bid for a £4m council contract. Two of them share a director. Nobody notices, because neither record carries a company number and the buyer has no way to check.
Sentinel works out which real companies the three bidders are, sees that two of them share a director, and flags the bid as connected — before the contract is awarded, not after an investigation.
A framework worth £200m produces 400 call-offs across dozens of authorities. Six suppliers win most of them. No single buyer sees the pattern, because each call-off is one record in one authority.
Sentinel adds up every order placed under that framework across every authority, and shows that six firms are taking most of it. This is the clearest warning sign available in UK data.
Data foundation
Every dataset below is open, or its access constraint is stated
| Dataset | Publisher | What it provides |
|---|---|---|
| Central Digital Platform | Cabinet Office | Supplier registration, unique supplier identifiers, contract performance notices, payment performance. Mandatory below-threshold registration from 1 April 2026. |
| Find a Tender Service | Cabinet Office | Statutory notices for above-threshold procurement across the UK public sector. |
| Contracts Finder | Cabinet Office | Contract award notices, including below-threshold awards in England. |
| Companies House API + bulk products | Companies House | Company records, officer appointments, PSC register, filing history, dissolution status. Free API under OGL v3. |
| Local authority spend over £500 | 300+ councils | Transaction-level payments. Fragmented schemas — normalised by System 10. |
| Charity Commission register | Charity Commission | Trustee networks, for public bodies contracting with the voluntary sector. |
Capabilities
Benefits
For government
- Gives the Public Sector Fraud Authority — now within DWP — an award-stage capability to sit alongside its existing payment-stage work.
- Lets the Government Commercial Agency see competition health across the whole public estate rather than one framework at a time.
- Provides evidence for debarment decisions under the Procurement Act, which currently rest on limited investigative capacity.
- Turns a compliance burden — the new notice regime — into a management asset, which strengthens the case for the transparency rules themselves.
For the public
- Money recovered or never lost is money not taken from services, using government’s own framing of savings as nurses and repaired roads.
- Local journalists and researchers get a usable national view of who wins public money in their area.
- Honest suppliers benefit: collusion suppresses competition and inflates prices, and SMEs are the main losers.
Delivery
Phasing
Risks & mitigations
Shared directors are common and usually innocent. The system scores risk and never asserts wrongdoing; every output is a prompt for human review with its evidence attached.
Companies House data has known accuracy problems. Identity verification under ECCTA is improving this, and Sentinel reports data-quality defects back as a by-product.
Publishing the indicator logic teaches evasion. Core indicators are published for accountability; weightings and thresholds are held privately and rotated.
Textbook cartel screening needs every bid including losing ones. Public data publishes awards, and independent analysis found the tenderer-count field is frequently recorded as zero. Sentinel can therefore detect single-bidder concentration, threshold splitting, rotation patterns and bidder relatedness — but not classical bid-rigging signatures. Going deeper requires buyer cooperation to supply their own tender records, which is a design assumption, not an afterthought. Any proposal claiming full cartel detection from open data alone is overselling.
Sources
All sources checked in August 2026. Figures carry the reference period of their source, which may differ from publication date. Where a figure could not be verified against a primary source it is not used.